Refletimos sobre educação, ética e suas relações com consumo, ambiente e vida. Discutimos criticamente a sociedade globalizada cujas relações socioambientais se baseiam no individualismo e na competitividade.

Regarding the selection of the legislative representatives, the elective system is the system that most democratic organizations have adopted. It has become so present nowadays that we take for granted the identification between elective system and representative democracy. But is this identification a correct one? I argue that it is not, since the meaning of 'representative democracy' has no reference to specific mode of selection of the representatives. And, since democracy and other methods of selection are compatible, it should adopted (...) the best one. The criteria of competence for the exercise of the political power ought to be the adopted method of selection, for it is the best one. I too argue that, in the context of division of labor into public and private labor, this is precisely what public representation aims: to leave to the experts the exercise of public labor. (shrink)

Os casos de fraqueza da vontade (incontinência) são tidos como paradoxais. Há, pelo menos, uma tensão entre tais casos e a lei psicológica que relaciona avaliações e volições: se julgamos que fazer x é melhor do que fazer y, então queremos fazer x; porém, por vezes, julgamos que fazer x é melhor do que fazer y e, ainda assim, queremos fazer y em vez de x. Como noutras propostas, defendo que a incompatibilidade é aparente. Porém, não rejeito que haja verdadeiros (...) casos de fraqueza da vontade. Proponho que, em tais casos, há uma cisão entre a força psicológica e o conteúdo axiológico das avaliações: o que o agente representa como mais valioso não é o que se encontra mais representado como valioso no agente e, portanto, aquilo que tem eficácia causal. Proponho, ainda, que o sistema volitivo desenvolveu um mecanismo de correção de tais anomalias, pelo qual o agente tem a capacidade de determinar volições de acordo com a avaliação do melhor. (shrink)

The title of the paper is an allusion to Philip K. Dick’s book Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (which inspired the movie Blade Runner) and aims, at once, to highlight the (possible) relation between Criminal Law and Artificial Intelligence in its two dimensions of criminal protection (hence the reference to ‘electric crimes’) and criminal liability (hence the reference to the androids’ dreams), within the background problem of knowing whether Artificial Intelligence is truly mind. The purpose of this paper is, (...) precisely, to identify whether there is indeed such relation, in those two dimensions, and making use of a mediating concept, the concept of ‘mind (or ‘mentality’). I argue that Artificial Intelligence “specimens” do not have a mind and, therefore, its protection and regulation by Criminal Law is impaired. I conclude by presenting a choice between a total irrelevance model of Artificial Intelligence to Criminal Law and a model in which Artificial Intelligence emerges as object and subject of Criminal Law by analogy with persons. (shrink)

This book addresses the European Court of Human Rights’ fairness standards in criminal appeal, filling a gap in this less researched area of studies. Based on a fair trial immediacy requirement, the Court has found several violations of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights at the appellate level by at least eighteen States of the Council of Europe in a vast array of cases, particularly in contexts of first instance acquittals overturning and of sentences increasing on appeal. (...) -/- On the one hand, the book critically engages this case-law with the law revisions it has recently inspired in European countries, as well as with the critiques and difficulties that it continues to raise. On the other hand, it interweaves insight from criminal procedure theory with new discoveries in the field of cognitive sciences (neuroscience of memory, philosophy of knowledge, AI), shedding an interdisciplinary light on the (in)adequacy and limits of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. (shrink)

The problem of the selection of the legislative representatives is the problem of knowing how this representatives are selected. The electoral system is the system that most democratic organizations have adopted and has become so present nowadays that we take for granted the identification between electoral system and representative democracy. However the meaning of ‘representative democracy’ has no reference to a specific mode of selection of the representatives. Being compatible with the democratic principle, the criteria of competence for the exercise (...) of the legislative function ought to be the instituted mode of selection, for it is the best one. In general, this is precisely what representation aims in the context of division of labour: to leave to the experts the exercise of some social function belonging to all. (shrink)

Porventura, o principal problema a enfrentar em Filosofia Normativa é aquele que designarei de ‘problema da compatibilidade’: as normas têm duas características essenciais, a necessidade e a violabilidade, que parecem ser incompatíveis. De acordo com a primeira das características intrínsecas das normas, se p é obrigatório, então p tem de ser verdadeira. De acordo com a segunda das características intrínsecas das normas, mesmo sendo p obrigatório, p pode não ser verdadeira. A capacidade para acomodar esta aparente natureza paradoxal das normas (...) constitui o teste derradeiro de verdade de uma tese em Filosofia Normativa. Defendo que só uma tese passa este teste: a semântica condicional, fortemente inspirada no que Husserl diz nas Investigações Lógicas. Esta tese rivaliza directamente com a semântica dos mundos ideais, surgida a par do desenvolvimento da Lógica Deôntica no século XX. Para a semântica dos mundos ideais, ‘p é obrigatório’ significa ‘p é uma verdade em todos os mundos possíveis que são os ideais’. Como o mundo atual não é um mundo ideal, fica explicado o facto de p poder não ser verdadeira no mundo atual, mesmo havendo necessidade. E se o mundo atual for um mundo ideal? Continua a não haver violabilidade: a verdade de ‘p é obrigatório’ no mundo atual garante a verdade de ‘p’ no mundo atual. Seguindo a semântica dos mundos ideais, as normas são invioláveis em todos os mundos ideais. Nesta dissertação, defendo que o termo ‘necessário’ é ambíguo e que, no contexto normativo, é usado de um modo particular: não designa o conceito modal de necessidade mas o conceito de indispensabilidade. Dizer que p é normativamente necessário é o mesmo que dizer que p é indispensável (para alguma coisa). Ora, é possível que ‘p’ seja indispensável e falsa simultaneamente. (shrink)

This essay has two parts: 1) a negative or destructive one, which consists of showing that there is no anomaly, even apparent, in the concept of ‘truth’ (and ‘falsehood’), so that the available theories of truth are not justified, either to solve or react to this alleged problem; 2) a positive or constructive one, which consists of proposing a characterization of truth (and falsehood) based solely on the “objective aspect” of this concept. Here, I will associate the concept of ‘truth’ (...) with the concept of ‘existence’, taking them as two different species of a common genus. Along the way, I will critically analyze the theories of truth “available on the market” and argue that truth only has an “objective aspect”. (shrink)

RESUMO De acordo com a teoria das funções de verdade, a verdade/falsidade de uma proposição é computável a partir da verdade/falsidade das suas proposições “internas”: para cada proposição há uma função entre valores de verdade. Aplicada a proposições modais, origina a semântica dos mundos possíveis e, aplicada a proposições normativas, origina uma semântica que reduz os conceitos normativos aos conceitos modais, a semântica modal. Esta redução fica posta em questão com a existência dos chamados ‘paradoxos da lógica deôntica’. Estes não (...) podem ser vistos como meras anomalias, mas devem ser vistos como indícios da incorreção da semântica modal. Em todos eles, a regra da necessitação, assim como o axioma da distribuição, “não batem certo”. Não obstante, o cumprimento/incumprimento das normas já é computável a partir da verdade/falsidade das proposições que expressam os estados de coisas devidos. ABSTRACT According to the theory of truth-functions the truth/falsehood of a proposition is computable from the truth/falsehood of its “internal” propositions: for each proposition there is a function between truth values. Possible world semantics arises from the application of that theory to modal propositions; modal semantics - the reduction of normative concepts to modal concepts - arises from its application to normative propositions. But the ‘paradoxes of deontic logic’, as they are called, undermine such reduction: they cannot be seen as mere anomalies but instead as evidence for the wrongness of modal semantics. In all these paradoxes, the necessitation rule, as well as the distribution axiom, fail. Nevertheless, the fulfillment/nonfulfillment of norms is computable from the truth/falsehood of the propositions which express the required states of affairs. (shrink)

Due to the rapid advance of the pandemic caused by COVID-19, several countries perceived that human and material resources would be insufficient to meet the demand of infected patients. The aim of this study is to analyze the knowledge of health professionals working in the pandemic about the application of ethical criteria in decision-making in situations of resource scarcity. This is a cross-sectional, descriptive, and quantitative survey study, conducted from June to December 2020, with health professionals working in the COVID-19 (...) pandemic in Brazil. We applied a questionnaire to assess the professionals’ knowledge about ethical criteria in decision-making in the allocation of scarce resources during the pandemic, containing 14 questions and possible score from 0 to 70, which was developed by researchers from documents and protocols validated by organizations from various countries, available in the first months of the pandemic, a sociodemographic characterization questionnaire and a self-assessment questionnaire regarding knowledge about bioethics. A total of 197 health professionals participated in the study, 37.6% of whom were nurses and 22.8% of whom were physicians, working in the Family Health Unit (28.4%) with a degree at the level of specialization (46.2%). Moreover, (9.5%) of nurses, (18.2%) of dental surgeons and (24.4%) of physicians reported that they have no prior knowledge about bioethics. Physicians and hospital workers scored higher on the knowledge assessment questionnaire. The mean score of the participants was 45.4 (SD = 7.2). Investments in training and professional education in the field of health focused on Bioethics are necessary, considering models and ethical theories that help professionals, managers and society to better position themselves in the face of pandemic contexts. (shrink)

Escrito en tiempos pandémicos, socializamos en el artículo los diálogos del Grupo Voces de la Educación con los movimientos docentes latinoamericanos que realizan investigaciones desde la escuela y la comunidad. Defendemos la pluralidad, diversidad y potencia de tales experiencias en la producción de otros procesos formativos, que nos llaman a la construcción de solidaridades necesarias para afrontar la barbarie de los tiempos actuales.

An increase in the number of older people with dementia is currently a trend around the world. In low and middle countries, effective public health services are not yet well‐developed, and family care‐givers may be overwhelmed by the requirements of care. This paper has two purposes: to share findings from an ethnographic study about family dementia care practices in Brazil and to draw attention to the significance of the materiality of care practices in the family context. The study was conducted (...) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. We describe the care trajectory of one family and, analysing data using the insights of Actor Network Theory, show the significance of objects in a networked relation of care. In particular, we show how incontinence products such as adult diapers assume different positions in the network, acting as either mediator or intermediary of care in relation to other elements of the network composed of family members and their living situation, the person with dementia herself, the doctor, and Brazilian health policies. Although the diaper is often seen as an ordinary object for care providers, its participation in a care network shapes relations, activating conflict, financial constraint, and disciplining the body of the person with dementia. (shrink)

RESUMO O artigo reflete sobre a pesquisa em andamento da autora, na linha de processos educacionais em artes cênicas, investigada pela via do Teatro em Comunidades, eixo específico abraçado pelo campo da Pedagogia do Teatro e fundamentado pela obra dos mestres contemporâneos Bertolt Brecht, Augusto Boal e Paulo Freire. O ponto de tensão desta discussão é o questionamento acerca da possibilidade de investigar a prática do Teatro em Comunidades como capaz de contribuir para construção de uma sistematização de procedimentos pedagógicos (...) teatrais em Educação Não Formal dirigida à formação de artistas e educadores, analisando de maneira crítico-reflexiva os resultados do estudo teórico-prático com enfoque em duas noções-chave: o gestus social e a dialogicidade. O estudo está sendo desenvolvido com jovens, professores e artistas da comunidade sede do município de Seabra, Bahia. Ao tecer considerações sobre a pesquisa de campo em andamento, conclui-se que um estudo desta natureza é relevante por conduzir a formação de artistas e educadores por um território de prática artística teatral que contribui para a edificação de um conhecimento consolidado a partir da ação coletiva, da experimentação prática e elaboração reflexiva pelo estudo das relações sociais. (shrink)

Vivemos, hoje, sob a hegemonia do paradigma tecnocêntrico, mercadológico e midiático. A Tecnociência, o Mercado e a Mídia se constituem em autênticos horizontes no interior dos quais se desvelam todos os âmbitos da experiência humana. Isso posto, o que o ser humano e a religião se tornam nessa nova situação epocal? A Tecnociência tornou-se horizonte de compreensão do ser humano em relação ao mundo e si próprio. Não apenas nossos estilos de vida, nosso modo de trabalhar e viver, são condicionados (...) pela técnica, mas também nossa identidade mais profunda é dada pela diferença técnica. Somos ainda vítimas da “absolutização do Mercado”: uma autêntica mercantilização da vida e, portanto, também da cultura e da religião. O mercado vai se impondo como único cenário de nossa trama civilizacional atual. Nossos fluxos vitais e também os valores e símbolos culturais e religiosos se tornam mercadoria de consumo e de descarte. Em tal contexto, a religião corre o risco de ser acometida por um duplo reducionismo. Esse tem sido o preço que a religião decidiu pagar em troca do direito de cidadania em um mundo dominado pela Tecnociência, pelo Mercado e pela Mídia. Palavras-Chave : Tecnociência. Mercado. Mídia. Religião. Mercantilização da vida. Absolutização do Mercado.We live, today, under the hegemony of a techno-centric, market-based and mediatic paradigm. Techno-science, the Market and the Mass Media are authentic horizons, in the interior of which are uncovered all of the scopes of the human experience. Having said that, what does human kind and religion become in this new era? Techno-science has become a horizon of comprehension of man regarding the world and of himself. Not only our lifestyles and our way of life and work are conditioned by technology, but also our deeper identity is lost by the technical difference. We are still victims of the “absolutization of the market”: an authentic mercantilization of life and, therefore, culture and religion. The market presents itself as the only setting of our present civilization’s story line. Our vital fluctuations, as well as the values and religious and cultural symbols become merchandise to consume and discard. In such a context, religion runs the risk of being attacked by a double reductionism. This has been the price that religion decided to pay in exchange for the right of citizenship in a world dominated by techno-science, by the market and by the Mass Media. Keywords : Techno-science. Market. Mass Media. Religion. Mercantilization of life. Absolutization of the market. (shrink)

O autor propõe algumas considerações sobre a TdL na celebração de seus 40 anos de existência. Num primeiro momento, ele destaca três características que justificam a pretensão avançada pela TdL latino-americana de se apresentar como “uma nova maneira de fazer teologia”: 1) nova relação para com a práxis; 2) nova perspectiva a partir da qual discernir os desafios postos pela práxis; 3) nova metodologia capaz de unir espiritualidade e método teológico. Num segundo momento, a TdL é reconhecida e apresentada como (...) uma autêntica theologia crucis . Isto significa que a cruz de Jesus é acolhida pela TdL em um tríplice modo: eixo gnosiológico, princípio epistemológico e critério formal. Por fim, o autor salienta o círculo virtuoso testemunhado pela TdL entre o local e o global. Epistemologicamente, a TdL é materialmente global e formalmente particular. Historicamente, ao longo de seus quarenta anos, a TdL tem se revelado como uma verdadeira teologia glocal , testemunhando um relação circular entre particular e universal. Palavras-chave: Teologia da Libertação. Práxis. Theologia crucis. Epistemologia teológica. Teologica glocal.The author proposes some considerations about Liberation Theology in celebration of its 40 years of existence. At first, he highlights three features that justify the claim put forth by Latin-American Liberation Theology of presenting itself as "a new way of doing theology": 1) new relationship vis-à-vis the Praxis; 2) new perspective from which we can discern the challenges posed by the Praxis; 3) new methodology able to unite spirituality and theological method. In a second moment, Liberation Theology is recognized and presented as an authentic theologia crucis . This means that the cross of Jesus is accepted by Liberation Theology in a threefold manner: agnostical axis, epistemological principle and formal criteria. Finally, the author stresses the virtuous circle witnessed by Liberation Theology between the local and the global. Epistemologically, Liberation Theology is materially global and formally private. Historically, throughout its forty years, Liberation Theology has been revealed as a true “ glocal” theology , witnessing a circular relationship between the particular and the universal. Keywords: Theology of Liberation. Praxis. Theologia crucis. Theological epistemology. “Glocal” (global + local) theology. (shrink)

This study aimed to understand the expressions of fear in the journeys of health professionals who worked in the confrontation of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19), in the city of Manaus, in the Brazilian Western Amazon. This is an exploratory qualitative study that adopts interpretive description as a method to generate informed knowledge responsive to the needs of the practice. We included 56 participants, comprising 23 health managers and 33 health workers (middle and higher level) of different professional categories. The results (...) revealed three circles of experience: (1) knowledge and professional experience in dealing with the disease (unknown–known–experienced); (2) the growing proximity to death and loss (predicted–witnessed–suffered); and (3) the involvement and proximity to whatever affects the individual, their emotions, and personal transformations in the face of the threat (the collective, the neighbor, and oneself). Our results suggest that health professionals who worked during the COVID‐19 pandemic in Manaus experienced insecurity, dread, and fear, illustrating the complexity of developing their activities in the front line of care and management during the different phases of the pandemic. A contribution of the study is precisely that of capturing this complexity, which suggests the impossibility of analyzing fear only in its simple manifestation, or in each circle of experience. (shrink)

Partindo de uma relevante premissa de Paulo Freire, a de que “a compreensão crítica do ato de ler […] não se esgota na decodificação pura da palavra escrita ou da linguagem escrita, mas que se antecipa e se alonga na inteligência do mundo. A leitura do mundo precede a leitura da palavra, daí que a posterior leitura desta não possa prescindir da continuidade da leitura daquele”, o vertente artigo procura analisar os primeiros anos do processo de construção social de um (...) indivíduo-leitor, a saber, Vitor Silva Tavares, timoneiro, a partir de 1974, da histórica casa editora & etc. Com uma infância vivida num meio nada culto ou diletante, e tendo abandonado precocemente os estudos liceais, Vitor Silva Tavares acabou por tornar-se, contra toda a probabilidade, numa figura marcante do campo da edição literária em Portugal na segunda metade do século XX. Ganhando ele espessura de caso, trata-se aqui de reflectir, a partir de elementos obtidos através do recurso à história de vida do referido editor, como sob a colagem de diversos efeitos, socializações e acasos se foi produzindo um perfil singular de indivíduo, perfil esse onde a atividade da leitura ocupou um papel determinante, gerando predisposições mentais, desafios, condicionando a própria vida que Vitor Silva Tavares quis levar, dedicada à prescrição editorial, à mediação da leitura, transferindo para outros impressões que foram primeiramente suas. (shrink)

The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification has been of undisputed theoretical importance in a wide range of contemporary epistemological debates. Yet there are a host of intimately related issues that have rarely been discussed in connection with this distinction. For instance, the distinction not only applies to an individual’s beliefs, but also to group beliefs and to various other attitudes that both groups and individuals can take: credence, commitment, suspension, faith, and hope. Moreover, discussions of propositional and doxastic justification (...) have rarely focused on broader meta-epistemological issues, and yet meta-epistemological positions can have important implications for first-order views about this distinction. This volume addresses these and other issues by bringing together 16 essays that advance the state-of-the-art thinking on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how such thinking shapes and is shaped by a range of issues previously neglected in contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary (...) value. (shrink)

Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include outright doxastic states and degreed doxastic states. The former include believing that p, having the opinion that p, thinking that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. The latter include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps some phenomenal states. But we also have conviction (being convinced simpliciter that p) and degrees of conviction (being more or less convinced that p). This volume shows: how and (...) why all of the outright doxastic states mentioned above can be reduced to conviction thresholds; what degrees of conviction fundamentally are (degreed reliance-dispositions); why degrees of conviction are not credences; when suspending a belief is compatible with continuing to believe; and the surprising extent to which Kant endorsed the theory of conviction that emerges in this volume. (shrink)

This article has two tasks: to investigate the notions of space, time and causality in Schopenhauer’s theory of knowledge and, subsequently, to carry out a comparative study of the results obtained with the epistemological considerations between the first and second phase of Nietzsche’s thought. It is understood that conclusions concerning the world as representation had an echo in the first digressions of the author of The Birth of Tragedy on the conceptions of space, time and causality. However, the departures begin (...) to be perceived still in the first years of the 1870s. It is chosen to call the reflections on knowledge until On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, considering, besides the unsystematicity of the Nietzschean approaches, the maturation of the epistemological investigations in Human, All Too Human. It is discussed how the naturalistic aspects of the second phase of Nietzsche’s intellectual activity find implications in his conceptions of space, time and, above all, causality. It is emphasized, however, that it is not the intention of this work to argue that Nietzsche’s epistemology is originally derived from Schopenhauer or that it depends exclusively on the notions studied here. (shrink)

I explain why, from the perspective of knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology, objective act consequentialist theories of ethics imply skepticism about the moral status of our prospective actions and also tend to be self-defeating, undermining the justification of consequentialist theories themselves. For according to knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology there are modal anti-luck demands on both knowledge and justification, and it turns out that our beliefs about the moral status of our prospective actions are almost never able to satisfy these demands if objective act (...) consequentialism is true. This kind of applied moral skepticism introduces problematic limits on our ability to use objective act consequentialism’s explanatory power as evidence for its truth. This is, in part, a product of higher-order defeat as I explain in the final section. There is, however, a silver lining for objective act consequentialists. For there is at least one type of objective act consequentialism, prior existence consequentialism, that is poised to avoid at least some of the epistemic problems discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul examines Kilwardby’s role in conciliating Aristotelian and Augustinian views on the soul, soul-body relation, and cognition.

This article aims to offer a fresh analysis of two passages in the extensive necromancy episode in Lucan's Bellum Ciuile: the ritual to reanimate the dead soldier's corpse (6.667–73), and the surgical procedure Erichtho then proceeds to undertake (6.750–7), resembling the practice of a vivisection. The study will focus mostly on the strong connection of magic to medical traditions in antiquity, with a commentary on, and analysis of, these verses through the lenses of medical vocabulary, themes and motifs. It ultimately (...) concludes that Lucan was familiar with the language and characteristics of the medical tradition, enriched his report with them, and was playing with his audience's knowledge of the same. (shrink)

When a belief is self-fulfilling, having it guarantees its truth. When a belief is self-defeating, having it guarantees its falsity. These are the cases of “self-impacting” beliefs to be examined below. Scenarios of self-defeating beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack sufficient reason to have any belief whatsoever. Scenarios of self-fulfilling beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack reason to have any one belief over another. Both scenarios have been used (...) independently to challenge Evidentialism, on which what we may rationally believe is all and only what fits our current evidence. Here we tie the two scenarios together and explore what a knowledge-sensitive evidentialist approach to one implies for the other. (shrink)

In this article I argue that characterizations of anger as a hostile emotion may be mistaken. My project is empirically informed and is partly descriptive, partly diagnostic. It is descriptive in that I am concerned with what anger is, and how it tends to manifest, rather than with what anger should be or how moral anger is manifested. The orthodox view on anger takes it to be, descriptively, an emotion that aims for retribution. This view fits well with anger being (...) a hostile emotion, as retribution is punitive. I will argue that a different view of anger deserves our attention. On this alternative view, anger aims for recognition of harms done, rather than for the punishment of those who have committed them. I argue that we have reason to favour a strong view that excludes retribution from anger’s main aims. In addition, I offer a diagnosis of the reasons that led the retributive view of anger to become, and remain, orthodoxy. This diagnosis provides indirect reason to give my descriptive proposal serious consideration, for it highlights that the orthodox view has dominated folk and philosophical conceptions of anger for reasons that do not speak in favour of the view’s veracity. The view that anger is a hostile emotion will therefore emerge as in need of serious scrutiny. (shrink)

[Significantly updated in Chapter 6 of Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge] In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P (...) is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline a novel theory of the epistemic requirement on possession in terms of this more general state of non-accidental true representation. It is just as well placed to explain the motivations behind knowledge-centric views of possession, and it is also better placed to explain the extent of the reasons we possess in certain cases of deductive belief-updates and cases involving environmental luck. I conclude with three reflections. First, I indicate how my arguments generate a dilemma for Errol Lord’s view that possessing reasons is just a matter of being in a position to manifest one’s knowledge how to use them. Second, I explain how my view can simultaneously manage cases of environmental luck without falling prey to lottery cases. Finally, I sketch the direction for a further range of counterexamples to knowledge-centric theories of possession. (shrink)

The political upheavals of China's Warring States period proved to be intellectually fertile, giving rise to one of history's greatest flowerings of political philosophy. The most eminent thinkers of the day sought to articulate models for good government amidst the ruins of the Zhou dynasty. Zhuangzi, on the other hand, appears to many readers to eschew these political questions. In this article, however, I contend that the Zhuangzi has a more practical political teaching than has often been appreciated. It is (...) intended to help others to navigate the treacherous political waters in which they might well find themselves, particularly in an era of profound instability, by teaching them how to understand their own... (shrink)

Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at (...) least one Conservative view that survives both difficulties, a view which has the further ability to undercut a crucial consideration that has supported Dogmatist views about perceptual justification. The final section explores a tension between Conservatism and the prospects of having a completely general account of propositional justification. Ironically, the problem is that Conservatives seem committed to making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy. My partial defense of Conservatism concludes by suggesting possible solutions to this problem. (shrink)

Language does not have to be held as a problem for radical enactivists. The scope objection usually presented to criticize enactivist explanations is a problem only if we have a referentialist and representationalist view of the nature of language. Here we present a normative hypothesis for the great question concerning the hard problem of content, namely, on how linguistic practices develop from minds without content. We carry representational content when we master inferential relations and we master inferential relations when we (...) master normative relations, especially when we are introduced into frameworks of authorizations and prohibitions. Inspired by the anti-intellectualism of the later Wittgenstein and Brandom’s inferentialism, we present the hypothesis that language emerges from inferentially articulated action from normative elements and not from manipulation in internal mental states of contents fixed by reference to external things. (shrink)

The notion of mathesis universalis appears in many of Edmund Husserl’s works, where it corresponds essentially to “a universal a priori ontology”. This paper has two purposes; one, largely exegetical, of clarifying how Husserl elaborates on Leibniz’ concept of mathesis universalis and associated notions like symbolic thinking and symbolic knowledge filtering them through the lesson of the so called “bohemian Leibniz”, Bernard Bolzano; another, more properly philosophical, of examining the role that the universal mathesis is allowed to play, and the (...) space it occupies in Husserl’s intuition-based epistemology. (shrink)